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INTRODUCTION: THE DEBATE ABOUT THE DEFINITION





administrationsin theUS andtheUK respectively)hadbecomethe
neworthodoxy.Williamson'saimwastocodifythatpartof theneo-
liberalanalysisandpolicyproposalswhichhavebecomecommonly
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The theoreticalfoundationsof theseproposalscanbe easily















theupperstrata,which were conceivedasthe locomotiveof the
economy.After all, thelimitedpublicexpenditurecando with less
taxes.Additionally,theoperationof thefinancialsystemshouldbe
liberatedfromthestategripandprerogativesandbelefttothefree





wont be any violations of propertyrights (as it had happened
previouslywithnationalisationsetc.).
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2003)andparticularlyacurrentassociatedwiththeworkofJ.Stiglitz
(1998a,1998b)andalsofromMarxistPoliticalEconomy(Fine(2001a,
2001b,2002),Shaikh (2003,2004».An importantpoint in this































trade and foreign direct investment).WashingtonConsensus'
macroeconomicdisciplineis of a particulartypeand hasspecific
prioritiesthatdifferentiateit fromothertypesof macroeconomic








complimentedwith thesimplisticbeliefthatit will lead.to increased
competitionandthusconsumerswill in theendbebetteroff.As itwill
beshownin thenextchapter,thesehadthesamenegativeeffectsas



























widespreadperceptionthatit failedand thatit led to crisesand
impoverishment.It would notbeunfairto statethatthetermtruly
carriesabadreputation.Thisis acceptedevenbyitsdefendersas,for
example,by Naim (2002)who acknowledgedthattheWashington
Consensusisa'damagedbrandname'.Criticismsandtheconcomitant
bad reputationdo notstemonly fromtheoreticaland ideological















and inequalitybothbetweendevelopedand developingand less














one,Le. theinabilityto exhibitan unambiguouslybettereconomic








problemsof a secondaryorder,whichmoreor lesswouldhavebeen
alleviatedoncethemarketwas freeto operateundisturbedby the









































SO/BULLETIN OF POLmCAL ECONOMY
In thefirstcase,Mexico,theproblemswerecausedbytheattempt
toopentheeconomyandintroducefinancialiberalisation.Thisledto
thecollapseof thepesoandthedefaultof theMexicandebt.In the
Asiancasethecrisiswascausedby theattemptsto conformto an
internationalenvironmenta-laWashingtonConsensusandatthesame
time to reform their internal structureaway from the Asian






of theAsian crisis.This causedthecollapseof thestockmarket,
subsequentdevaluationsof theroubleandfinallythesuspensionof
itsconvertibility.In theBraziliancasetheattempttoir1troducefinancial







































financialcrisisdue to bad bankloansto householdsand foreign
currencyexposureofbusinessclients.




accountcausedby a fall-offin therapidgrowthof exportsin most
countries.But,thiswascausednotbychangesin whathaduntilthat
timebeensuccessfulinternalstabilizationpolicy(followingtheAsian
developmentalmodel), but ratherby changesin the external
environment( owardsWashingtonConsensustandards),overwhich
theyhadlittlecontrolandtherewerefewpolicyresponsesavailable.
This is a characteristicof the world of increased economic
interdependenceandfreeglobalcapitalflows.Thus,unlikeMexico,it
is impossibletoarguethatexcessivedomesticbanklendingandreal
exchangerateappreciationled to a consumptionandimportboom
whicheventuallycreatedanexpandingforeigndeficitthatspeculators

















In theRussian caseof 1997-9thecrisis followed a differentpath.
Followingthecollapseof the SovietUnion, a transitionprocessto a
market economy was initiated. Policiesof shock adjustment to a
liberalised, privatised and open economyw:ere systematically
employed. The result was the tremendous transfer of wealth and
resourcesto a handful of previouslyunknown foreigncapitalistsand
to groups of previous managers.On the other hand the Russian
economyshrank considerablyand largesegmentsof the population
were impoverished. The opening and the financialisation of the
economybrought foreign investorsto theRussianstockmarketboth
for easyhefty returnsand in orderto diversify theirportfolios.When
the Asian crisis occurredin 1997many of themwithdraw from the
Russian marketin order to coverlossesin Asia whiletheIMF made
thesamemistakeit madein Asia, i.e.pressingtheRussiangovernment
togofurthertotheliberalisationof theeconomytowardsWashington
Consensusstandards.Thus, in June 18th1998it delayeda$670million
trancheof a loan to Russia.After that theRussiangovernment
succumbedto the IMF demandsand increasedland taxes.Although
the IMF releasedthe loan and also gavean additional one,political
and social tensions (e.g. a miners' strike) scared investors, who
withdrew for a secondtimefrom theRussianmarket.This ultimately
ledtothefall of severalgovernmentsand,despiteinitialrefusals,to
subsequentbig devaluationsof the rouble forcing- in the end - the
suspensionof itsconvertibility.
In thecaseof Brazilthewholeaffairwasbornoutof theneoliberal
fixationwith hyperinflationwhich existedbut,contrarytootherLatin
American economies,was not creatingsignificant problems as the
foreignaccountwasnotexcessivelyimbalanced,theexchangeratewas
not overvalued,netpublic debtasa shareof GDP was declining,and





. a direct increase in the costs of capitalsincetherewas no long-
termcapitalmarket,
. an increasein thegovernmentdeficit,sincetheoutstanding
debtwasdirectlylinkedtoshort-termrates.
. anincreasein therateof inflationthroughtheimpactoncapital
costsandonthefiscalimbalance.






Thefinancialsystemoperatedasarentieron thefloat createdby the
adjustmentlagsin theindexingsystemof financialcontracts.Indeed,
therewas hardly any long-termbusinessfinancingto be done.Only
the Statecontinuedto invest in any appreciablemagnitudeand this
peculiarlyBrazilian characteristicof efficient state financing of
investmentwas under increasingattackfrom therapid deterioration
of governmentfinancesand the neo-liberalpush towardsincreased





of the exchangeratepolicyof thepreviousperiodfrommaintaining
competitivenessthroughdevaluationtomaintainingcompetitiveness
by creatingpressureondomesticproducersfromforeignimports.Since
it was difficult for domesticproducerstoadjusttheircostsrapidly;the
realappreciationof theRealproducedagrowingpaymentsimbalance
in thenewcontextof liberalisedforeigntrade.The foreigncapital
inflows thatmatchedthegrowingtradeimbalancealsohad animpact
on fiscal conditions,sincetheCentralBankadopteda policy of
sterilizationof inflowsinordertoprotectitsinflation-fightingmonetary
policy.As result,thecontinuedrelianceonhighinterestratesreinforced
the imbalances on the foreign and domestic (fiscal) accountsand
reversedtheeconomyfrom one of inertialinflationto tendential





and the U.S. Treasury: market liberalization, opening to foreign
investment(particularlyforeigndirectinvestment)andareducedrole
forthestatein thedirectproductionof goodsandservices,butalsoas
a promoterof development.As such,foralmosta decadeArgentina
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privatisations,tax reforms,cuts in stateexpenditure,etc.The












































the economyhas goneinto free fall. The Argentineaneconomy
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Sachs(1987».For thesecriticstheoriginalversionis toorigid (by
disregarding intermediatepositions betweenthe extremes9f
indiscriminateliberalizationandarbitraryinterventionism)andjumps
to policy recommendationsbC/sedsimplyon themaximizationof
liberalization.Thus,a searchfor a reformistversionbegan.Several



























































with theWashingtonConsensus,wherethestateis not seenas a
correctivepower. It contrastsalsowith the old Keynesianbig
governmentpolicies.TheearlyKeynesianoppositiontotheWashington








protection.For him thequestionis notwhetherthestateshouldor
shouldnotbeinvolved,butratherthequestionof how it shouldbe
involved.His mainargumentis thatthestateis notanti-marketforce
butacomplementaryone.













this failure.Thus, developmentpolicyshouldnot aimonly to the





















allow for transactioncostsand marketimperfections.Thus, the
definitionofmarketimperfectionsi broadenedandtheargumentfor
stateinterventiontomitigatethemisreinforced.Thiscontrastsdirectly
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otherchannelsthatarebeingneglectedbytheWashingtonConsensus).
Finally,heemphasizestheroleof thefinancialsystem(the'brain'of
theeconomy)and arguesthattheaimshouldnotbe a liberalized
financialsystembutaproperlyregulatedandefficientone.





















thedevelopingby prohibitingfor thelattertofollowthepathof the
former.Shaikh,also,showsthattheseill-guidedpoliciesstemfrom
theerroneousorthodox'theoryof comparativecosts'andheargues
that an approachbasedon theclassicaltheoryof 'competitive
advantage'is bothanalyticallyandempiricallysuperior.
Similarly,Fine (2001a,2001b,2002)criticisestheWashington
Consensus for consciously neglecting crucial aspectsof the
developmentprocessin orderto pushtheneo-liberalreformsthat
promotethe interestsof domina.ntcapitalisteconomies.He also



































costly the provision of utilities) and the erosionof the state's
redistributiverole(throughregressivechangesintaxationsystemsand
thecurtailmentofpublicexpenditure).
For the radical critiquetheway forward for the developing






strategywou~dnecessarilyhave to strive againsthegemonical
internationaleconomicrelations.
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theliberalisationof internalandexternalmarkets,it appliedin all




survivalof thefittest)-withlimitedabilityof thestateto adulterate
thisprocess-asa meansof overcomingthecrisis.The Washington
Consensusi thebrainchildofthesecurrentsinthefieldofDevelopment
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theoryandpolicy.As suchit hassimilarmeritsbutalsosuffersfrom














Theseinabilitieslie at theheartof thefailuresof neo-liberalism
andoftheWashingtonConsensus.Tantamounttothatis therenewed
emphasis-eitherbyitssupportersorbyitsmainstreamcritics-onthe




of them.Theirmaintrustis thattheyrepresenta rupturewithinthe
continuumof neo-liberalism.Theybuiltuponits successesbutalso
strive to correctits deficiencies.Thus a new role for the state-














moreradical and rigorousinstrumentsthan simple institution-
building.In a sense,wheretheWashingtonConsensuscreates(or
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expands)markets-and in somecaseswhere this cannot be done it
createsquasi-marketsby imposingprivate-sectormodesofoperation-
thepost-WashingtonConsensusattemptstocreatequasi-societiesas
complementsto the markets.It neglectsthat it is social and class
intereststhatcreateinstitutionalframeworksandrules-and som.etimes
evenmarkets.Furthermore,the division in differentsocial and class
interests is not the result of more or less fleeting informational
asymmetriesbutofmorefundamentalanddeep-rootedsocio-political
factors.For all thesereasonsand despite the valiant critique of its
proponentagainstitspredecessor,it seemsthatthemostthatthepost-
Washington Consensuscan offeris a compromisewith the former.
This is probably bound to produce similar dismal results with the
WashingtonConsensusregardingthedevelopmentprocess.The only
areawhereit mayhavea limitedsuccessis in a formof gatopardismo-
toborrowfromLucinoViscodi'sfamousfilm:everythingin thesystem
has tobechangedin order for thesystemtoremainunchanged.
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